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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the mid-1990s a coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and supportive 
states campaigned successfully for an international ban on anti-personnel mines. The 
campaign is widely regarded as a model for future non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
campaigns1, and as an example of the growing influence of civil society on international 
norms. It is said to exemplify a new kind of multilateralism in which NGOs, international 
institutions and small and medium states can generate global policy norms, without the 
backing of great power states. In its wake a campaign for the regulation of small arms 
emerged. This was expressly modelled on the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ICBL), but has so far been less effective.  
 
This paper is a comparative analysis of these two campaigns. It draws out the factors 
behind the success of the ICBL and uses them to analyse the small arms campaign. 
External factors include geopolitical conditions, the effects of globalisation, and the 
attitude of other actors in the international system. Internal factors comprise the framing 
choices of campaigners and their skill in contesting normative space, by linking the 
proposed new norms with pre-existing supportive norms and disassociating them from 
unfavourable precedents. It will examine whether the small arms campaign’s lack of 
success calls into question the supposed enhanced capacity of civil society to influence 
international norms, and casts doubt on the putative emergence of a new system of global 
governance which can supersede the interests of powerful states. Ultimately the question 
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is whether the ICBL is a useful model for successful campaigns, or a one-off success 
attributable to a coincidence of external circumstances and issue-specific factors which 
enabled NGOs to generate common interest with states2. 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN 
LANDMINES 
 
The success of the landmines campaign was a result of a combination of convenient 
external conditions and the ICBL’s skill in conducting its campaign. The post-Cold War 
geopolitical background provided a window of opportunity for NGO input into ‘national 
security’ issues. Globalisation created new possibilities for transnational co-ordination 
and multilayered campaigning and an emerging system of complex multilateralism 
offered NGOs a greater role in global governance. The ICBL was fortunate too that 
opposition from other actors was not as strong as it might have been. Crucial to 
generating support was how the ICBL framed landmines in a humanitarian context and 
contested the normative space into which the ban was to be introduced. A final important 
element was the unique nature of landmines as weapons, which meant that prohibition 
could be an effective solution.  
 
                                                 
2 J. Marshall Beier, and Ann Denholm Crosby, ‘Harnessing Change for Continuity: The Play of Political 
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Geopolitical Conditions: the End of the Cold War 
 
The ICBL took place in the immediate Post-Cold War era, beginning in 1992 and 
climaxing with the signing of the Ottawa Convention in December 1997. This time 
period could be regarded as a window of opportunity for NGO participation in 
international politics for several reasons. Firstly, the climate of mutual suspicion between 
the two blocs during the Cold War had discouraged the participation of NGOs in 
international politics3. This obstacle to NGO participation was greatly reduced with the 
fall of Communism.  
 
Secondly, the ideological divide which had polarised international politics evaporated, 
allowing small and medium states a freedom they had previously lacked to adopt 
positions of their own. This enabled greater consideration of individual policy proposals, 
rather than automatic support for one of the two blocs4. During the Cold War, a state 
would have been unlikely to take action on a ‘national security’ issue like landmines, 
without first securing its allies’ support. Unilateral measures such as the Belgian ban on 
landmines, which helped to build momentum early on, may not have been possible5. The 
backing of small and medium states, such as Canada, Norway and Ireland, was crucial, 
and was boosted by the Ottawa Process’6 use of majority voting7. This was a break from 
Cold War practice, when consensus-based decision-making had become the norm in 
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order to avoid excluding large blocs8. Using majority voting was critical as it is faster and 
prevents action being blocked by recalcitrant states. Consensus remains the default 
system within many UN bodies, including the machinery set up under the Certain 
Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW), which was the existing multilateral 
framework dealing with landmines, so the ICBL’s establishment of a fast-track 
negotiating system outside of UN auspices was key and would not have been possible 
during the Cold War. 
 
Thirdly, the benign international security environment led to a large decrease in military 
expenditure9 and a decline in emphasis on national security. This created more space on 
the global agenda for ‘soft’ issues10, such as humanitarianism and development— areas 
in which NGOs were regarded as experts and legitimate participants. Thus an opportunity 
was provided for NGOs to exert a greater influence on global policy11. States like Canada 
were also promoting the concept of human security at the time, which redefined security 
in terms of individuals, rather than states12. This de-emphasised ‘national security’ 
concerns such as preserving the military balance of power and controlling weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). Instead the focus shifted to defending human security by 
controlling conventional weapons like landmines. 
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Globalisation and the Transnationalisation of Civil Society  
 
Although globalisation is an intensely contested concept, at a minimum it refers to 
increasing global interconnectedness, meaning more transnational connections between 
firms, individuals, and civil society groups as well as increasing interstate or international 
connections13. Communications globalisation and cheaper, faster international transport 
have encouraged the development of transnational connections between individuals and 
NGOs in different parts of the world. Coupled with this is an increasing awareness that 
problems are shared by the globe as a whole, rather than confined to nation states or 
regions; a process which has been encouraged by the spread of global media. This sense 
of global interconnectedness has been dubbed ‘globality’14 and is a factor behind the 
tentative emergence of ‘transnational civil society’.  The transnationalisation of civil 
society involves the formation of new transnational political communities and the 
strengthening of pre-existing ones, representing the development of an alternative form of 
political identity, which is issue-based, rather than territorial.  
 
The ICBL can be regarded as an example of transnational civil society in action15, 
building a transnational community around landmines, with individuals in different 
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countries linked by their mutual concern about the issue. It generated global awareness of 
landmines by campaigning simultaneously in numerous countries and at various levels of 
governance, whether national, regional or global16. It held international conferences 
attended by people from seemingly disparate parts of the world, and was sustained by 
technological globalisation, with activists communicating via telephone, fax and email17. 
Creating a transnational landmines community was a necessary precondition for 
mounting an effective campaign, but the existence of a transnational issue-based 
community in no way guarantees an influence on international norms. For NGOs, 
influencing international norms means persuading more powerful actors of their 




The capacity of NGOs to influence other actors has arguably been strengthened by the 
changing nature of global governance. The importance of intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) has increased in recent years due to the transnationalisation of trade 
and finance and deregulation at state level, which has created a need for re-regulation at 
global level. Growing recognition of the interconnectedness of global problems has also 
encouraged the delegation of more matters to the international level, which increasingly 
involves non-state actors, such as the media, ‘experts’, business, and NGOs, as well as 
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states and IGOs. This emerging form of global governance has been called complex 
multilateralism18. 
 
NGOs are allowed to participate in this system because they serve several useful 
functions for IGOs. Although the problems the latter are tasked with solving affect the 
lives of millions, there is no direct democratic input into their deliberations and they have 
been subject to much criticism as a result. IGOs have attempted to remedy this 
‘democratic deficit’19 by involving NGOs, whom they regard as serving a democratising 
purpose through providing a link with the public and increasing oversight of global 
governance20. In contrast to the divided attentions of state representatives, who cater to a 
multitude of different interest groups and may be more concerned with other national 
interests than the issue at hand, the ability of NGOs to focus exclusively on one issue can 
make them more effective in international fora21. Kaldor emphasises ‘the parcellization of 
authority not on a territorial basis but on the basis of issues’22 as a defining characteristic 
of IGOs, and the fit between the issue-based natures of IGOs and NGOs provides further 
explanation for the emergence of complex multilateralism.  
 
As NGOs do not possess any ‘hard power’ in the sense of coercive abilities or large 
financial resources, their influence within this system relies on their ability to persuade 
states to support their viewpoints. The ICBL drove policy on landmines by exercising its 
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‘soft power’. It established itself as the foremost expert on landmines, generated an 
undeniably large level of public support, and exploited the NGO advantage of being able 
to focus narrowly on one issue23. It used both direct lobbying and public mobilisation to 
exert pressure on states to support a ban24, and capitalised on the greater access to 
international negotiations afforded it by the Ottawa process.  
 
Strong Support and Weak Opposition from International Actors 
 
A crucial factor behind the success of the ICBL was the attitude of other actors in the 
international system. The campaign succeeded in generating strong support from small 
and medium states, while the opposition of powerful states like the US, Russia and China 
was not as stiff as it might have been. In terms of supportive states, the ICBL was also 
fortunate in the composition of international political leadership at the time. The Liberal 
Canadian government was crucial to the campaign’s success, with the foreign minister 
Lloyd Axworthy giving it a huge boost by challenging all the states present at a 1996 
landmines conference in Ottawa to return the following year to sign a treaty25. This 
unorthodox step contravened diplomatic protocol and would not have been taken by a 
less personally committed politician— illustrating the importance of individual national 
leaders in promoting the ban. While the Convention was being negotiated in 1996/7, New 
Labour came to power and became the first British government to support a ban. The 
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same applied for the new government in France. As major producers, the support of these 
two states was critical26 and may not have occurred if different personnel had been in 
power.  The recent collapse of apartheid was also important, as the support of Nelson 
Mandela’s new government helped to convince African leaders to sign the treaty27 
 
As for state opposition, although the Clinton administration opposed the Convention, its 
outlook was more multilateral than that of the later Bush government. Other opposing 
states included Russia and China, who might be thought of as ‘critical states’28, given 
their status as major weapons producers. With the end of the Cold War however, neither 
was able to exert sufficient pressure on other countries to support them. Opposing states 
were also circumvented by the Ottawa process, which restricted full participation to states 
who favoured a complete ban, allowing only observer status to other states29. Despite the 
non-participation of the US, China and Russia, none of them outright opposed the ideal of 
eventually eradicating landmines. This was reflected in the unanimous passing of a 
General Assembly Resolution in December 1996 urging states to pursue a ban30. Indeed 
during the conference held at the signing of the Ottawa Convention, all three states 
indicated they would eventually comply with most of its provisions31. Although the US 
ostensibly favoured eventual prohibition, its demands at the Oslo conference in 
September 1997 that all the permanent members of the Security Council be included for 
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the ban to enter into force, and that the treaty should be abrogable during wartime32, 
revealed that really it wanted to prevent a ban emerging at all.   The fact that states could 
not openly admit their opposition to a ban was testament to the success of the ICBL in 
generating a taboo around landmines. 
 
Another actor within the complex multilateralism system which might have been 
expected to oppose the Ottawa Convention was business. In practice however the major 
arms companies were not vociferously opposed to a ban33 due to the relative economic 
insignificance of anti-personnel mines. It was estimated that the trade in landmines 
accounted for less than $100 million of the $20 billion a year global arms trade34, so 
landmine sales were not proportionally significant. Landmines were also not very 
profitable; retailing at between only $3 and $2735. In fact, given that removing a mine 
from the ground can cost from $200 to $100036, demining will probably be more 
profitable for the arms industry than landmine production37.  In addition landmines 
tended to be manufactured by small contractors38, rather than large arms companies who 
would wield more influence over governments. Civil society opposition was also not an 
issue for the campaign, as unlike small arms landmines serve no peacetime function and 
are not in civilian possession.  
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 Framing & Contesting Normative Space: Establishing a Global 
Prohibition Norm 
 
Both the landmines and small arms campaigns could be described as processes of norm 
generation, whereby a concerted effort is made to generate new norms governing the 
behaviour of individuals and states. A norm is defined as ‘a standard of appropriate 
behaviour for actors with a given identity’39, and both campaigns represent attempts to 
change these standards. From a legal perspective, this is achieved through the 
enforcement power of states, which will translate states’ international legal commitments 
into domestic laws regulating the behaviour of individuals in their jurisdiction. From a 
normative perspective however, the new norm operates by exerting a moral compunction 
to comply on both states and individuals, through stigmatising the newly inappropriate 
behaviour. It is this feeling of moral obligation, generated by a shared sense that a norm 
is just and should be obeyed, which gives a special potency to norms40, exceeding that of 
other types of international regulations. This ‘oughtness’ of norms can be so powerful 
that it can obviate the need for the strict verification procedures usually involved in arms 
control regimes.  
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The process of development of a norm from initial proposal to general acceptance has 
been described as the ‘norm life-cycle’41. The first stage of ‘norm emergence’ involves 
the framing of issues by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (concerned individuals and NGOs) and 
attempts to persuade states to adopt the new norm42. How norm entrepreneurs 
contextualise an issue within a particular discourse, define it as a problem and propose 
solutions — a process referred to here as framing — is crucial to the success of this 
phase43. Context largely determines which actors are allowed to participate in policy 
formation and therefore which solutions can be put forward. Problematising the issue 
generates a perceived need for solutions, with the way in which the problem is defined 
making particular solutions seem appropriate. In other words the construction of new 
cognitive frames creates new ‘logics of appropriateness’44, in the context of which the 
proposed new norm will appear a fitting solution. Therefore it is often necessary to wage 
a lengthy framing contest before an effective campaign advocating specific normative 
solutions can be run.  
 
Prior to the ban campaign, anti-personnel mines were seen as a legitimate weapon 
forming an essential part of states’ national security arsenal. They had been in widespread 
use for many years and there was no precedent for the banning of a common 
conventional weapon. The traditional procedure for arms control within this context was 
for consensus-based negotiations under UN auspices, which moved at a glacial pace. 
Arms control treaties typically establish rigid verification procedures, which often 
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constitute major sticking points for states suspicious of outside interference in their 
national security policy, thus slowing progress. The ICBL recognised that the landmine 
debate must be shifted away from this national security context, as this was traditionally 
regarded as the exclusive domain of states45 and not as an area that NGOs should 
influence. Their first objective was therefore to change that context. 
 
The traditional sphere of NGOs is humanitarian, so in order for them to be seen as 
experts on landmines, and for their views to be taken seriously by states, they needed to 
frame the issue in their field of humanitarian expertise.  They did this by focusing on the 
human impact of landmines, rather than the security reasons why they had been put in 
place. This was achieved through publishing research which illustrated the extent of the 
problem from a humanitarian perspective. Members of the ICBL, and in particular the 
Landmine Survivors Network, were also able through their field operations to accumulate 
emotive images and personal testimonies of landmine victims, which made military 
arguments about the defensive need for mines seem callous. This enabled them to move 
away from the detached, objective-sounding language used by states to discuss national 
security issues to the franker, more emotionally-charged language of humanitarianism46. 
The power of first-hand, graphic accounts of human tragedy is something that even the 
most hardened state representatives would find hard to ignore, particularly when there is 
an obvious chain of cause and effect 47. 
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The victims featured in ICBL campaigns were usually women and children, despite the 
fact that 60% to 70% of landmine victims are men48. New norms which seek to protect 
innocents from bodily harm have been identified as among the easiest to popularise49, so 
this was an effective strategy for the ICBL to adopt. Using images of women and children 
served as pictorial shorthand to illustrate the point that landmines were maiming and 
killing civilians rather than combatants. All of this contributed to the framing of 
landmines as an apolitical humanitarian matter and shifted the focus away from national 
security concerns. 
 
Framing the landmine issue as a humanitarian crisis implied that an urgent solution was 
needed. Whereas states are reluctant to intervene in matters of arms control and change in 
that context is slow, in situations of humanitarian crisis an expectation of rapid 
multilateral action has evolved50. Despite the fact that landmines had been a problem for 
many years, the ICBL engineered a sense of urgency through extensive advertising 
campaigns and generating statistics which illustrated the extent of the problem. Some 
international relations theorists argue that ‘the perception of a crisis or shock is a crucial 
factor in precipitating ideational or normative change’51, and this seems to have been 
recognised by the ICBL.  The contrast between their rhetoric of crisis and the slow 
plodding nature of international legal negotiations at the 1993 CCW Review Conference 
was obvious and created a perceived need for an alternative ‘fast-track’ process. Framing 
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the issue in a humanitarian context meant that landmines were no longer seen as a purely 
national security issue and liberated states from having to pursue a treaty through the UN 
Conference on Disarmament (CD), as suggested by opposing states. 
 
Besides framing, another vital element of the norm emergence phase is how norm 
entrepreneurs relate the proposed new norm to pre-existing norms52: in other words how 
they contest and fight for ‘normative space’. This involves discrediting opposing norms 
and highlighting or creating links with supportive norms. In the case of landmines, the 
norms which had to be superseded were those of legitimate use and military utility. 
Opponents of prohibition argued that irresponsible use, rather than the weapon itself, was 
the problem, and that better regulation of landmines could mitigate the humanitarian 
crisis. Essentially they were arguing for the continuation of the pre-existing norm of 
legitimate use, but with more conditions attached. The ICBL would not even comment on 
proposals made after the first session of the CCW Review Conference to distinguish 
between different types of mines, since ‘to lobby on those issues is to acknowledge the 
continued legitimate use of landmines’53. Through its presentation of the landmines issue 
as a humanitarian crisis which had ‘literally exploded under the very watch of the 
CCW’54, the ICBL undermined the notion of legitimate use on which the CCW was 
based.   
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Another means of doing this was to situate the landmine itself as the problem55. 
Landmines were portrayed as independent agents of destruction, lying in wait for their 
victims, beyond human control56. This conveniently distanced the issue from the 
governments that laid the mines and the states whose military industries produced them. 
Situating agency in the landmine allowed the ICBL to avoid engaging in any wider 
interrogation of the rights and wrongs of war, the military-industrial complex57 or other 
national security norms58. The landmines problem became the fault of the landmines 
themselves59. This was an effective strategy as it ruled out the possibility of a norm of 
legitimate use and led to the conclusion that only a complete ban could solve the 
problem. It also had the secondary desirable effect of helping the ICBL to enlist the 
support of states, as it provided a means of framing the landmines issue without 
antagonising states through emphasising their culpability.  
 
A second norm which the ICBL needed to overcome was that of military utility. This was 
achieved by publishing several documents which argued that landmines were not 
particularly useful for regular state armies and so not essential to national security60. 
Gradually the ICBL, and in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross, was 
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able to persuade an influential portion of the military61 that the utility of mines was 
questionable 
 
Another aspect of contesting normative space is linking the proposed new norm with pre-
existing supportive norms, as a new norm is more likely to successfully emerge if it is 
anchored in a pre-existing normative discourse62 or has a legal precedent. In the case of 
landmines, this was done by framing landmines as a humanitarian issue and highlighting 
the (by now) self-evident relevance of international humanitarian law (IHL). An essential 
tenet of IHL is the concept of proportionality between military utility and suffering which 
is used to determine whether a weapon should be permitted. As the military utility of 
landmines had been discredited, that balance now shifted towards suffering, and hence to 
prohibition. IHL also prohibits means and methods of warfare which are indiscriminate, a 
criterion which was shown to apply to landmines by the use of images of maimed 
civilians in ICBL advertising campaigns. It is worth noting here that the nature of 
landmines as weapons made them amenable to prohibition. As the landmine is a single-
use weapon, ‘used’ only once when a victim steps on it, second-hand trade is not a major 
issue63, making a ban easier to enforce.  
 
Once the norm has completed the emergence phase, a ‘tipping point’ occurs64, after 
which it becomes accepted by most states and enters the ‘norm cascade’ phase65. 
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Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the tipping point usually requires participation by a 
third of relevant states, but it is also important that ‘critical states’— the identity of whom 
will vary from issue to issue— adopt the norm66. Reaching the tipping point could 
therefore be used as a barometer for measuring the success of a campaign. The ICBL 
succeeded in reaching this point, whereas the small arms campaign is still at the stage of 
norm emergence, where a framing contest is being waged prior to the possible emergence 
of strong norms. Whether or not a tipping point comes about depends on how skilfully 
NGOs frame the issue and contest normative space, but also on external factors such as 
geopolitical conditions and the strength of opposition to the new norm. As will become 
clear from the following analysis of the small arms campaign, less favourable 
combinations of these factors can result in diminished campaign impact. 
 
 
THE SMALL ARMS CAMPAIGN 
 
The small arms campaign has to contend with a less encouraging international context 
than the ICBL.  External conditions such as the end of the Cold War and globalisation, 
have had more negative consequences for small arms proliferation. The War on Terror 
has mitigated against NGO influence on international politics and the campaign faces 
stiffer opposition from a broader variety of actors. Finally, the more complex nature of 
the issue has made framing and transnational coordination more difficult, limiting the 
effectiveness of the campaign. 
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Regulating Small Arms in a Post-Cold War climate 
 
Individual NGOs began working on small arms in the mid-1990s67, but a coordinated 
campaign did not emerge until 1998 when IANSA was established68. Some of the 
positive effects of the end of the Cold War for landmines regulation applied to the early 
years of small arms campaigning. The relaxation of national security concerns in favour 
of soft issues and the lack of an international ideological divide facilitated NGO 
participation in global politics and greater freedom of movement for small and medium 
states such as Canada, which hoped to reprise its earlier role by pushing for small arms 
regulation69. 
 
However the scale of the problem was increased by factors stemming from the end of the 
Cold War, such as the breakdown in state control of arms stockpiles which led to major 
leakages in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The privatisation of state-
owned arms industries also led to indiscriminate arms sales by newly profit-hungry 
companies. Brokers became harder to control, with previously government-sanctioned 
operators whom intelligence agencies had used to set up grey market deals during the 
Cold War becoming detached from national security interests and selling to the highest 
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bidder70. As a result the ramifications of the end of the Cold War were more of a mixed 
bag than had been the case with landmines. While efforts to regulate small arms certainly 
benefited from some of the positive aspects of the post-Cold War political climate, 
proliferation actually worsened. 
 
The War on Terror and the Return to National Security 
 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks happened just two months after the Small Arms Conference71. 
Although the conference succeeded in temporarily raising public awareness, it was 
overshadowed by 9/11 and its repercussions. The renewed emphasis on national security 
due to the War on Terror has reduced the profile of soft issues on the global agenda, 
undermining the efficacy of NGO efforts to frame small arms in their fields of expertise. 
It has also returned the focus of arms control discourse to WMD, as evidenced by events 
in Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and is likely to result in diminished funding for small arms 
control72. When small arms are considered by states, it is now more likely to be in the 
context of national security73, as illustrated by the recent relaxation of US human rights-
based arms export criteria74. The ‘with us or against us’ attitude of the Bush 
administration has also reduced the freedom of movement of NGOs and small and 
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medium states. Anticipation of a negative reaction from the US might help to explain the 
failure of small and medium states to form a core group on small arms, despite the 
absence of substantial progress at the Small Arms Conference.  
 
The War on Terror has had some positive side effects on the small arms issue however. 
International financial transactions are now more open to scrutiny, with the conclusion of 
over fifty agreements against money laundering75. This should make it more difficult for 
the proceeds of illicit arms deals to be hidden in offshore bank accounts, thus hindering 
arms brokering and illicit trade. Many countries have also stepped up border controls, and 
this has been linked to an increase in the market price of small arms76, indicating 
decreased supply.  
 
Globalisation and Small Arms 
 
Aspects of economic globalisation which have made small arms control more difficult 
include the transnationalisation of the arms industry and the deregulation of international 
trade and finance. Western defence industries are becoming more export-oriented due to 
the decline of state subsidisation. This trend has been exacerbated by the 
transnationalisation of production and brokering. 1,249 firms in over ninety countries are 
currently involved in production77, while brokers can locate different parts of their 
operations in different countries; capitalising on arms surpluses in one part of the world 
                                                 
75 United Nations, Report of the United Nations First Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the 
Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, A/CONF.192/BMS/2003/1, 18. 
76 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied, (Oxford: 2003), 62. 
77 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk, (Oxford: 2004). 
and high demand in another, or conducting their business in weak states with poor 
regulation to circumvent what few international controls exist78. 
 
Financial deregulation has meant that proceeds from illicit arms deals can be hidden in 
offshore tax havens, making the tracking of international arms deals difficult. Although 
this problem has been alleviated to some extent by the recent conclusion of agreements 
against money laundering, the sheer volume of international financial transactions, which 
have increased massively since the 1970s, makes comprehensive enforcement 
problematic. Wars are also being prolonged by combatants’ easy access to global 
markets, enabling them to trade conflict goods like diamonds or drugs in exchange for 
small arms79.  
 
On the other hand, the same globalising factors which facilitated the creation of a 
transnational landmines community still exist. Media globalisation has helped raise 
awareness of the problem and technological globalisation has facilitated communication 
between campaigning NGOs in different countries. Despite this, the campaign has been 
less successful than the ICBL in coordinating its activities, partly due to framing 
difficulties, and partly because IANSA failed to adopt a strong advocacy role from the 
outset80. In the early days IANSA aimed for breadth rather than depth of support and 
even included a disclaimer on its documents saying the views expressed were not 
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necessarily shared by all participants81. In contrast the ICBL spoke with one voice from 
the outset. Human rights and humanitarian NGOs were said to have felt excluded due to 
the omission of their concerns from the PoA, and operated largely independently of 
IANSA82. Better coordination will be needed to take advantage of the multilayered 
campaigning opportunities offered by the transnationalisation of civil society and there 
are some signs that this is now happening. In 2002 IANSA appointed a new director with 
the aim of providing ‘strategic and dynamic leadership to a network of NGOs’83 and 
launched the ‘Control Arms’ campaign as a joint venture with Oxfam and Amnesty 
International in 200384. Now that improved coordination seems to be taking place, the 
campaign may prove more effective. 
 
Complex Multilateralism & The Attitude of Other Actors in the 
International System 
 
The emerging system of complex multilateralism which was exploited by the ICBL may 
not be so easy for the small arms campaign to utilise. The US and other opposing states 
are now more aware of the threat posed to their interests by coalitions between NGOs and 
like-minded states85, so the element of surprise has gone. 
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Other international actors such as the arms industry and civil society are also more 
opposed to small arms regulation. As for the UN, it appears determined to avoid a 
repetition of its circumvention by the Ottawa process86. 
 
Turning first to states, opponents have been largely the same as for landmines, but are 
better prepared and have pre-empted regulatory efforts from the beginning.  An example 
was the participation of major producers like the US, Britain and France in an early 
meeting of supposedly like-minded states and NGOs in 199887. The participation of 
opposing states in the Small Arms Conference also contrasts with the Ottawa process88, 
as does the use of consensus rather than majority voting. As a result the Programme of 
Action (PoA) was defined by the lowest-common denominator positions of recalcitrant 
states. For example, even though the vast majority of states agreed that sales of military-
style weapons to civilians should be banned, the issue was omitted due to US opposition 
89. 
 
The ideological orientation of many governments has swung to the right since 1997, but 
perhaps the most significant change has come from the US. The Bush administration 
appears almost ideologically opposed to multilateralism, refusing to support the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the International Criminal Court, and 
invading Iraq against UN wishes. A generalised disregard for multilateralism and 
                                                 
86 Hubert, The Landmine Ban, 54. 
87 Hubert, The Landmine Ban, 51. 
88 Hubert, The Landmine Ban, 37. 
89 Batchelor, ‘NGO perspectives’, 39.  
international law is clearly not conducive to the development of new global norms. In 
addition, the Republicans strongly support the US gun lobby. 
 
State support is also weaker with even seemingly supportive states varying in their 
enthusiasm for different types of regulation. Many developing countries support marking 
and tracing, weapons destruction and monitoring measures, but oppose export controls 
and conditionality90. Hubert has highlighted the dangers of NGOs allying themselves 
with governments too early in a campaign, before their full support has been clearly 
established. He notes that the ICBL was careful not to form an alliance with states until 
they had fully committed to supporting a ban and that the small arms campaign should 
follow its example91. Whether IANSA can claim to be independent of state influence, 
even at this early stage, is dubious, given its funding by Britain, Belgium, Sweden and 
Norway92. 
 
Another salient difference from landmines is the attitude of the major arms companies. 
The value of the legal small arms trade is estimated at $4-6 billion a year93, and thus 
represents a significant proportion of weapons transfers94. As a result, the arms industry 
is more vocal about small arms regulation and the economic importance of military 
industries undoubtedly influences state positions. The arms industry is also a major 
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backer of the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA)95 which 
participates as an NGO in the UN process. Part of its strategy is to differentiate between 
licit and illicit trade, encouraging governments to target only the latter –the position taken 
by the PoA. As the line between licit and illicit trade is notoriously blurred96, the arms 
industry’s opposition to transparency measures is unsurprising97. The global illicit trade is 
estimated at less than $1 billion a year, but at 10-20%98 this represents a high proportion 
of all sales.  
 
Civil society groups represent another formidable opponent which did not exist for the 
ICBL. The main opposing group is WFSA which represents thirty-three organisations in 
over fifteen countries, including hunting and sports shooting groups, and manufacturers99. 
Its most prominent member is the National Rifle Association (NRA), a group whose 
influence on the American delegation to the Small Arms Conference was huge100, 
ensuring that no references to controlling transfers to civilians or non-state actors were 
included in the final PoA.  
 
While the arms industry opposes regulation in order to protect its profits, groups like the 
NRA represent a different set of norms for the campaign to overcome. Private gun 
ownership has been an intrinsic part of US popular and political culture since the days of 
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the earliest settlers and enjoys both secular and religious support. The latter comes mainly 
from the Christian right which links the right to bear arms to the Christian tenet of the 
right to self-defence101. Overcoming a norm which is embedded in religious belief 
represents an additional difficulty for the small arms campaign.  
 
The UN’s attitude to the issue has arguably been more territorial than helpful, with 
Hubert concluding that ‘within the UN, the Department of Disarmament Affairs has until 
recently done more to inhibit than to promote coalition building’102. The sidelining of the 
UN was a crucial factor in the success of the landmines campaign, and if 
intergovernmental action remains confined to the machinery set up under the PoA, it 
cannot achieve significant progress. Small arms has been pigeonholed as a national 
security and arms control matter within the UN103 and while the process remains under 
UN auspices it is unlikely to overcome this compartmentalisation.  
  
Although the emerging system of complex multilateralism provides greater opportunities 
for NGOs to influence global policy, it provides no guarantee of success. This is 
illustrated by the differing responses of the two campaigns to the two UN conferences 
dealing with landmines and small arms. Like the CCW Review Conference, the Small 
Arms Conference represented an opportunity for NGOs to influence global policy 
formation. The terms of access for NGOs were better, allowing them limited speaking 
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time104. Despite this, the small arms community, unlike the ICBL, was unable to use the 
venue as a launching pad for a fast-track campaign. Ironically, the ICBL may have 
benefited from its exclusion from the CCW Review Conference, as it dramatised the fact 
that states were excluding humanitarian concerns from consideration. By incorporating 
IANSA within the conference, the UN maintained control of the process and possibly 
diluted the vehemence of NGO advocacy. The result was that the Conference failed either 
to come up with radical, binding regulations or to generate any momentum for an 
independent negotiating process.  
 
Since then there have been two Biennial Meetings of States which were mandated only to 
comment on the implementation of existing policy. A Review Conference is slated for 
June 2006, but the outcome of the PrepCom105 in January was discouraging, with states 
failing to agree on the final conference document, which would have set the parameters 
of the June agenda. This was due to opposition from a small number of countries 
including the US, China and India. It is noteworthy that none of these countries has 
ratified the Ottawa Convention either106, but that it still went ahead without them. The 
only way forward from this impasse may be to again set up an independent negotiating 
procedure outside of UN auspices. IANSA is of the opinion that any renegotiation of the 
PoA at the Review Conference is unlikely107 and that the UN process may even end 
afterwards. Perhaps by removing small arms from UN auspices, momentum could be 
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built for a fast-track negotiating process, similar to Ottawa, which would operate on the 
basis of self-selection by states willing to adopt more concrete measures. If this were to 
happen, the UN would once again be undermined.  
 
Framing Small Arms as a first step towards Norm Generation 
 
Small arms are a far bigger problem than landmines. Approximately 639 million guns are 
in circulation, causing roughly 500,000 deaths a year108, compared to 26,000 for 
landmines109. Because of the obvious usefulness of small arms, the idea of prohibition 
would be a non-starter, so instead the focus is on re-defining legitimate use; a more 
complex undertaking. As yet there is no consensus over which forms of use should be 
delegitimised, or in what order. When is use by civilians and non-state actors legitimate? 
How is government misuse to be defined? The ICBL avoided these questions by siting 
agency in the landmines themselves and problematising all use. The famous NRA slogan 
‘guns don’t kill, people do’, encapsulates the difficulties of problematising small arms per 
se. The consequences of seeking regulation rather than prohibition are significant, as 
regulation implies different legal forms and uses different compliance procedures. It will 
also be more difficult to generate public support for complicated regulations. 
Exacerbating the problem definition difficulties is controversy over which weapons 
should be included under the heading of ‘small arms’. Gun industry advocates suggest 
that only fully automatic ‘weapons of war’ should be included110, while IANSA wants 
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coverage of all small arms ‘which are recovered in the context of armed conflict and 
crime’111. The PoA avoided this issue by never defining small arms.  
 
The small arms campaign is still at the first stage in the norm life cycle— that of norm 
emergence. There is no general agreement about which norms should be prioritised, with 
proposed norms including: bans on sales to non-state actors112 or to situations where they 
are likely to be used in human rights abuses113; prohibiting civilian possession of military 
weapons; and conventions on marking, tracing114 and brokering115. One reason for this 
proliferation of competing norms is that the campaign has not settled on a single frame, 
making solutions stemming from a number of contexts appear equally valid.   
 
The multipurpose utility of small arms means they touch on a diverse range of issue-
areas, including development, domestic violence and terrorism, making frame selection 
more difficult. During war, they are the default tool of combat and in peacetime, they are 
used for hunting, crime, suicide and self-defence. Although it is advisable for different 
NGOs to highlight different aspects of an issue so as to make the best use of their various 
skills and knowledge, the campaign would arguably be more effective if it followed the 
example of the ICBL by emphasising one particular frame in its advocacy work. This 
                                                 
111 IANSA, Tracing Illicit Small Arms: Opportunities for the first substantive session of the Open-Ended 
Working Group on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, (2004), 2-3. 
112 Proposed by Canada prior to the SA Conference. 
113 Proposed by a coalition of NGOs including Amnesty International, the British-American Security 
Information Council, the Arias Foundation, Oxfam, the Federation of American Scientists, Project 
Ploughshares, Saferworld and the Friends Committee. 
114 Draft Convention on the Marking, Registration and Tracing of SA and Light Weapons, drawn up by 
Groupe de récherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP). 
115 Model Convention on the Registration of Arms Brokers and the Suppression of Unlicensed Arms 
Brokering, <http://www.grip.org/bdg/g2055.html > (7/9/04). 
would help campaigners get a stronger message across and generate greater publicity and 
momentum.  
 
The campaign must select a frame which can encompass as many aspects of the issue as 
possible, while situating it in a context where NGOs are seen as experts and legitimate 
participants in policy formation. The chosen frame must also be capable of galvanising 
popular support for urgent action. Given the political sensitivity of the problem, a further 
consideration is whether it can depoliticise the issue. The context in which small arms is 
framed will suggest a particular set of normative solutions, which can be linked to pre-
existing supportive norms or disassociated from opposing norms as part of the process of 
contesting normative space. Frames which have been proposed by NGOs include 
humanitarianism, human rights, development, public health and crime control. All of 
these are areas in which NGOs have an input in policy formation, so they are more 
suitable from the campaign’s perspective than the current national security/arms control 
framework. Each frame suggests different types of solutions, is more relevant to some 
aspects of the problem than others, and draws on varying constituencies and levels of 




Framing small arms as a humanitarian issue seems an obvious choice. Humanitarian 
campaigns have a good track record and defining a situation as a humanitarian crisis 
creates an expectation of speedy intervention116. IHL provides a legal precedent for 
regulation of weapons use, with the possibility of linking new norms to those precedents. 
Depoliticisation is another useful consequence. But there are also some disadvantages. 
IHL only applies to situations of armed conflict, whereas small arms use is equally 
common in peacetime. As conflicts are now mostly confined to developing countries117, 
this approach could risk situating small arms as an exclusively Third World problem and 
overlook the opportunities for mobilising public support afforded by the effects of gun 
crime in the West118. Although a humanitarian frame could be useful in promoting 
measures such as preventing transfers to zones of conflict where IHL is breached, it may 
not be suited to reducing the total quantity of guns in circulation; a measure which is seen 




Human rights is often regarded as the area of international governance in which NGOs 
have most influence, so in terms of choosing a frame which allows NGOs to seen as 
legitimate participants in policy formation, it possesses an advantage. Unlike 
humanitarianism, a rights-based approach can apply to conflict and peacetime contexts 
and to both the North and South. It comes with a ready-made legal framework of 
supportive norms to which new norms could be linked, anchoring them to a pre-existing 
normative discourse and thereby increasing their chance of success120. The UN Special 
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Rapporteur on Small Arms has suggested developing the norm of ‘due diligence’ in order 
to obligate states to regulate the availability and use of small arms as a means of 
protecting the right to life121. In the context of controlling trade, various NGOs have 
produced a Framework Convention122 which would expand the norm of state 
responsibility to make states accountable if they assist in committing internationally 
wrongful acts by exporting small arms to locations of human rights abuse. 
 
Rights discourse places a strong emphasis on attributing responsibility for violations and 
defining the content of states’ obligations to protect human rights. Adopting a blaming 
approach could be counterproductive however, as it could make it more difficult to 
persuade states to adopt new norms. A related disadvantage is that human rights lacks the 
perceived ‘neutrality’ of humanitarianism, partly because ‘naming and shaming’ are 
essential components of the work of human rights NGOs, but also because human rights 
is sometimes regarded as a western-imposed ideology, with less resonance for other 
cultures. The rights-based approach also lacks the emotive appeal of humanitarianism, as 
rather than emphasising the protection of innocents, it stresses the dignity and autonomy 
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This approach involves likening small arms-related injuries to a disease epidemic, with 
causes and impacts analysed in a scientific, seemingly objective manner123. It avoids 
attributing blame by positioning such injuries as statistical occurrences, with the goal 
being to reduce their incidence. Just as reducing exposure to viruses helps to control the 
spread of disease, reducing access to guns is seen as a means of reducing the number of 
injuries124. This returns the focus to the weapon itself, rather than the person pulling the 
trigger. The public health perspective also encompasses the demand side of the problem, 
as it recommends addressing the root causes of violence as part of a preventative 
healthcare approach125. It is more versatile than humanitarianism, as it applies to 
peacetime as well as conflict, and to developed and developing countries. It can also draw 
on health economics126, calculating the cost of injuries, lost earnings and so on, as a 
means of making economic arguments for small arms control. If proliferation could be 
defined as an economic issue, then more effective action could be anticipated.  It would 
be difficult for governments to argue against proof that small arms proliferation did not 
make economic sense.  More research needs to be done to accumulate the necessary 
evidence to back up such arguments, particularly in developing countries. Much of the 
health economics evidence comes from the US, where small arms injuries are estimated 
to cost the economy $100 billion a year127. The economic effects are likely to be even 
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more dramatic for developing countries however: it is thought that Latin America’s GDP 
is reduced by 15-20% a year by small arms violence128. 
 
A possible disadvantage of the public health approach is that, unlike humanitarianism or 
human rights, it has no international legal framework, which could make linking new 
public health-based norms with pre-existing supportive norms more difficult. However 
the lack of a specific international framework could prove advantageous, avoiding the 
restriction of small arms regulation to a single area of international law, such as IHL. 
This could make it easier to draw on legal precedents from other fields such as 
international trade law, which enjoy better compliance. Another disadvantage of using 
the public health frame is that its dry scientific approach may not be as effective in 
galvanising public support as the emotive appeal of humanitarianism. If small arms 
injuries can be likened to a public health crisis and a ‘health scare’ created however, there 
could be a strong basis for popular support. The overall advantage of the public health 
frame is its versatility which has led to its proposal as a means of uniting the various 
strands of the issue129. 
 
All the above frames possess advantages and disadvantages, as they involve different 
frameworks of supportive norms and emphasise different aspects of a multidimensional 
problem. By examining a sample of possible frames it was intended to illustrate the 
consequences of framing choices for the eventual success of an NGO campaign. The 
external conditions in which a campaign takes place will also influence which frames will 
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be suitable for mobilising public support and media attention, so both external and 
internal factors need to be considered in tandem. A final matter to consider is whether the 
norms which eventually emerge will attract a high level of compliance. Whereas the 
landmines problem was resolvable through a single prohibitory norm, which could exert 
a strong moral obligation to comply and be relatively easy to monitor compliance with, 
the small arms issue requires more complex regulations, the very complexity of which 
could lessen the normative pull towards compliance, as well as making compliance more 
difficult for NGOs to monitor. The CCW provides evidence of the failure of a complex 
regulation system in the absence of strict compliance procedures. It follows therefore that 
small arms regulation will require more stringent verification procedures, and need to be 
enforced by states. Unfortunately securing state agreement to such measures will be more 
difficult than getting them to agree to a norm-based treaty, and requiring strict 
verification procedures returns the issue to the national security/arms control format 





The preceding sections have outlined the external and internal factors which influenced 
the ability of the NGO campaigns around landmines and small arms to influence global 
policy formation. It was suggested that in order for a campaign to succeed, it is necessary 
for favourable political opportunity structures to exist130. The focus on geopolitical 
conditions was intended to illustrate that regardless of internal factors, whether an issue 
comes to prominence is largely dependent on wider forces outside of campaigners’ 
control. The current geopolitical climate is not conducive to small arms regulation in the 
same way as the end of the Cold War was to the prohibition of landmines, and ongoing 
forces of globalisation have tended to exacerbate small arms proliferation, while the 
campaign has been unable to successfully exploit the emerging system of complex 
multilateralism to deal with the problem. 
 
Because NGOs do not possess ‘hard power’, they are reliant to a much greater extent than 
other actors in the international system on the tools of ‘soft power’, namely persuasion 
and expertise, which they use to popularise their frames for issues. NGO campaigns 
cannot succeed without the support of other actors in the international system, 
particularly states. Measures which powerful states regard as seriously counter to their 
interests are unlikely to succeed and if states are preoccupied with other issues such as 
the War on Terror, they are less likely to support an NGO campaign on issues they regard 
as irrelevant to this overriding concern.  
 
The first conclusion stemming from this is that the success of the ICBL was largely a 
result of the ‘interwar’ climate in which it took place. Parallels exist with the extensive 
involvement of NGOs in international politics during the interwar period of the 20th 
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century131, and the lobbying of Tsar Nicholas II by NGOs to convene the Hague 
conferences132. If Hubert is right that ‘the 1990s can be characterized as a neo-idealist 
period with strong parallels to the decades preceding each of the two world wars.’133 
(Hubert, 2000: 70), then the 1990s may come to be regarded as another ‘interwar’ period 
in which a temporary window for NGO participation in global policy formation opened, 
before being shut with the advent of the ‘War on Terror’. The current national security-
dominated climate seems largely to have returned NGOs to their previous Cold War 
position of relative impotence, although the new opportunities for transnational 
coordination and multilayered campaigning offered by globalisation may go some way to 
offsetting this.  
 
A second reason for the success of the ICBL was that it reduced the landmines issue to a 
simple clear message. This has not been the case for the small arms campaign, raising the 
possibility that problems in need of more complex solutions may not amenable to NGO 
campaigning. As the small arms problem cannot be solved through the introduction of a 
simple prohibitory norm, it will be more difficult for NGOs to generate support. This is 
because NGOs generate soft power by mobilising public support, which is easier to do 
behind a simple clear moral message than behind a more nuanced call for complicated 
technical regulations. Although NGOs are now able to play a greater role in international 
politics, because of the emergence of complex multilateralism, and the improved 
opportunities for transnational cooperation provided by communications globalisation, 
their power is still very much circumscribed by external conditions and the limitations 
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132 Rutherford, ‘The Hague and Ottawa Conventions’, 45. 
133 Hubert, The Landmine Ban, 70. 
imposed by the ways in which they generate support. NGOs are largely dependent on the 
media to mobilise public support, and on their ability to persuade states to support their 
positions, something which varies according to geopolitical conditions outside of their 
control. In the case of landmines state opposition was not as strong as it might have been 
due to the relaxed international security environment ushered in by the end of the Cold 
War. This was not the case for post-9/11 small arms campaigning, which has faced much 
tougher state opposition. Similarly traditional UN arms control negotiating structures 
have proved impossible for the small arms campaign to circumvent, in contrast to the 
ICBL, which benefited from an element of surprise in establishing the independent 
Ottawa process.  
 
Although globalisation has increased NGO power by increasing their ability to exert 
simultaneous pressure for change from different levels and locations of governance, the 
success of the ICBL should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule of NGO 
participation in international politics. Although the ICBL has been highlighted as an 
effective NGO campaign, the landmine ban could not have occurred without a 
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